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Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict
Liability
Fleming James, Jr.*
[This is the substance of a paper read at the Round
Table on Jurisprudence at the 1956 meeting of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, as a part of a panel discus-
sion. The three formal speakers were asked to initiate the
discussion by presenting their respective philosophies of "The
Jurisprudential Basis of the Law of Strict Liability." These
speakers were to use as a basis for discussion the following
group of cases:
-Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 61 (1835) (The "horse and
buggy" accident case).
-Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456,
124 N.W. 221 (1910).
-A typical modern motor traffic accident case.
-Lutheringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
-Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).]
My approach to tort problems has not been primarily a
philosophical one. Yet it has been concerned with much beyond
the concepts and rules of tort law itself. It has often been pre-
occupied with the practical implications of tort law for the social
and economic problems of current life.
In dealing with such problems one must, of course, have a
standard of values for assaying the problems themselves and
the merits of possible solutions to them. And these values in
turn must rest on some sort of justification. I have pretty much
accepted values which have wide current recognition, and sought
to employ them along pragmatic and utilitarian lines. This has
not, however, meant a ruling out of moral considerations. Widely
held feelings of what is fair or just must necessarily play a most




important part in the solution of legal problems, whether the
matter be viewed in terms of expediency or in terms of divine or
natural law which is thought of as having an existence independ-
ent of the minds of men and only imperfectly reflected in them.
More concretely, things which I accept as good include: the
dignity of the individual; the physical well-being of the indi-
vidual; a wide freedom of speech, especially about matters that
concern the public; the possession or receipt of property or
money; the engaging in lawful activities for the production of
goods or services, or entertainment, and the continuing develop-
ment of the arts and sciences to advance such production; satis-
fying the prevailing community sense of justice or fairness.
The opposites of these things are bad.
These values are here vastly oversimplified. In other con-
texts they would need great qualification. At least some of them
might not stand up at all. But in the present context they will
serve as a useful point of departure for analysis, though the
attempt to apply and balance them in the varying situations
dealt with by tort law will yield no easy or automatic answer.
Let us start with Vincent v. Stinehour,' which exemplifies
the unintended and undesired injury caused by D while he is in
the course of pursuing a lawful activity - with what is generally
called accidental injury. The loss caused to P is bad, but it has
already happened. If D must pay, this merely shifts the evil
from P to D and society gains nothing from that shifting (al-
though something might be said for a sharing of the loss by the
participants) .2 Moreover D has gained nothing from the acci-
dent and his conduct, if it was not negligent, carried no un-
reasonable threat of causing an accident. Current notions of
fairness would be offended by making innocent D pay damages
1. 7 Vt. 62 (1835). "This was an action of trespass for defendant's driving
against and over the plaintiff with his horse and sulky." Plaintiff asked the court
to charge that if they found plaintiff while walking out of the travelled path was
run upon by defendant, "the plaintiff must recover, though there was no fault,
neglect, or want of prudence on the part of the defendant." The court declined
so to charge, and instructed the jury instead that "there must be some degree of
negligence . . . on the part of the defendant, to charge him." Defendant had a
verdict and the judgment entered thereon was upheld on appeal.
2. The argument would rest on the concept of marginal utility, i.e., that a
man's "bottom" dollar is his most valuable dollar, and each dollar added to that
has decreasing value to him. If the wealth of P and D before the accident amount-
ed to 100 units each, and P'a wealth has 'been impaired by 20 units by the acci-
dent, then more of value (in terms of human satisfactions) will be conferred on
P by adding 10 units to his remaining 80, than will be taken away from D by sub-
tracting 10 units from his 100, which the accident left intact.
[Vol. XVIII
BASES OF STRICT LIABILITY
under the circumstances described. Further, liability would tend
somewhat to discourage his activity (which, by hypothesis, is
good). That deterrence, however, is not an unmixed evil -if
it is not too great it might not keep D from carrying on his
activity but simply make him more careful in the prosecution
of it.
Balancing all these considerations, the rational rule may well
be to exonerate D unless the manner in which he was carrying
out his legitimate activity was unreasonably dangerous. This is
the rule of negligence and makes sense as applied to matters
between neighbors.
The case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. s calls
into play some different considerations. Here, too, P has been
hurt by D's lawful conduct. But D did save his own much more
valuable property by a deliberate choice of action which en-
tailed damage to P as a foreseen and inevitable consequence.
To shift P's loss to D under such circumstances serves some
good because the very conduct which caused P's loss has pre-
served to D more valuable property out of which to pay that
loss. From a purely utilitarian point of view, the net ill effects
of the loss will therefore be reduced by this shifting. If the
parties started with equal means, the marginal utility of the
sum representing P's loss is now greater to P than to D.4 More-
over, shifting the loss will not inhibit desirable conduct on D's
part. From society's point of view, D's conduct in deliberately
causing a loss is justifiable only because it prevents a greater
loss or produces a gain. The greater the disparity between the
saving (or gain) and the loss, the greater the justification. The
greater this disparity, the less will D be deterred from making
the saving (or gain) by fear of liability for the loss. It is only
where the saving (or gain) approximates the loss that such
3. 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). In this case the master of a vessel,
under stress of an unforeseeably violent storm, kept his ship moored to plaintiff's
dock after the full discharge of the vessel's cargo, for the purpose of preserving
the vessel. The court held that prudent seamanship required this course to be
followed and, in fact, the ship was saved at the expense of damage to the dock
which was substantial ($500) but presumably far less than the damage which
would have been caused to the vessel if she had been cast loose.
Some of the lines by which the vessel was originally secured to the dock parted
and chafed in the course of the storm. As soon as this happened the line "was
replaced, sometimes with a larger one." The court concluded that defendants "de-
liberately and by their direct efforts held her in such a position that the damage
to the dock resulted, and, having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the
dock, it seems to us that her owners are responsible to the dock owners to the
extent of the injury inflicted," in spite of the absence of any negligence.
4. Compare note 2 supra.
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liability will deter the choice to make the saving; and in such
cases society has little motive to encourage the conduct which
inflicts the loss.5
Quite aside from these considerations from expediency, the
prevailing climate of moral opinion will accept the notion of
making D- though innocent of fault- pay for a loss he de-
liberately caused another either to make a gain for himself or to
save himself from greater loss. This is attested by the univer-
sality of provisions for compensation where eminent domain is
exercised to produce a public gain by inflicting loss on an in-
dividual.6
Where D's conduct is not to preserve his own interest pri-
marily but interests of third persons, this basis of liability on
D's part may fail. There may be a reason for distributing P's
loss among the beneficiaries but this will depend on many fac-
tors, such as the authority of D thus to act on their behalf.7
We come now to the case of the modern accident. This is a
far cry from the typical accident of a century ago. It is no longer
a matter between neighbors wherein the loss must be borne by
one or the other of them. It is usually the by-product of com-
mercial or industrial enterprise, or of motoring. These facts
characterize the typical modern accident: The victims as a group
fall in the lowest income brackets and are therefore least able
to bear the economic loss involved.8 Those who are held for
these accidents (under modern systems of liability and proposed
extensions of them) have the means for combining and dis-
tributing these losses widely among the beneficiaries of the en-
terprise. Moreover these potential defendants have chosen to
engage their activity in the face of statistical certainty that it
will take a toll of life and limb.9 Recent studies show that ac-
5. See Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Inter-
ests of Property and Personality, 39 HxAv. L. REV. 307 (1926). Cf. RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 73 and comments (1934).
6. See 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.2, 1.3 (3d ed. 1950).
7. See Bishop & Parsons v. Macon, 7 Ga. 200 (1849) ; Feld v. City of Des
Moines, 39 Iowa 575 (1874) ; Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714 (1848) ; The
Mayor, etc., of New York v. Lord, 18 Wend. 126 (N.Y. 1837) ; see note 5 supra.
8. Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and its Consequences, 3 LAW &
CONT. PROB. 466 (1936) ; McNiece & Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention
and Compensation, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 585, 588 (1952); COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO
STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES,
LAW OF TORTS § 11.1 (1956).
9. It is not meant that any individual participant in, e.g., the activity of motor-
ing will inevitably inflict injury. Two things can, however, be said with consider-
able assurance: (1) such an activity taken in the aggregate will inevitably take
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cidents are not usually caused by morally blameworthy conduct
on the part of the people actually involved on the scene. 10 Ac-
cident liability is not generally borne by the personal partici-
pants, but by absentee defendants like employers or insurers.
Civil liability- even strict liability under workmen's compen-
sation - has not discouraged useful enterprise but has acted as
a spur to accident prevention by the parties best placed to pro-
mote it."
Under these circumstances - if you look at the real incidence
of liability and not the nominal defendant in litigation - the
reasons for liability without fault in the Vincent case apply to
the modern accident. The loss is shifted to those who are
benefiting from the enterprise which more or less inevitably took
the toll. In addition, the loss is widely distributed and its ill
effects thereby minimized by an even further application of the
economic law of marginal utility. Moreover the risk of loss is
thus made certain and calculable.
Morality and a sense of fairness might well be offended if
the loss were shifted to the individual defendant who was the
innocent instrument for causing it. The matter stands differently
where the loss is distributed among the beneficiaries of the enter-
prise that had to inflict losses to gain the benefits.
Perhaps I should mention here what seems to me to be a
necessary rational corollary to strict liability in accident cases.
The argument for meeting the human needs of accident victims
and distributing their loss among the beneficiaries of the enter-
prises that cause them is not an argument for full compensation
to these victims as we think of compensation in tort cases today.
It calls for damages or awards which will provide for care, cure,
and rehabilitation; for the preservation of homes and the neces-
sary maintenance of dependents during periods of incapacity;
for the reparation of economic loss. But allowance for intangible
items like pain and suffering (natural enough where compensa-
tion is made by a wrongdoer) may well be out of place where
the bill is being footed by innocent persons.
12
some toll (though we hope it will be reducible) ; (2) even the individual entrepre-
neur on a large scale (e.g., the running of a railroad, or a fleet of trucks) for a
considerable period of time, must contemplate the statistical certainty of an acci-
dent toll.
10. 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAw OF TORTS § 11.4 (1956).
11. Id. § 12.4.
12. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW
19581
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This line of reasoning would, I submit, warrant strict liability
generally for accidents caused by enterprises or activities where-
in risks are now combined, or feasibly could be and would be
combined in response to pressure. 18 The same reasoning would,
a fortiori, justify imposing strict liability on extra-hazardous
activities, as was done in the Luthringer14 and Chapman"
cases.'
6
Some of the same considerations apply to Sorenson v. Wood, 17
but not all. And here I think countervailing considerations out-
weigh them at least in that part of defamation which lies within
the field of debate and discussion of issues of legitimate public
interest. What will be deterred here, if liability is strict, will
not be the enterprise as a whole but the publishing of potentially
defamatory matter. And this would lead the owners of our
modern channels of communication to restrict their use in public
& CONT. PROB. 219 (1953) ; James, Book Review, 25 HARV. L. RECORD No. 7, p. 1
(Nov. 7, 1957) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 (1956).
13. See, in general, Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 298, 373, 423 (1911), reprinted in STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 436
(1926); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv.
359 (1951) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS c. 14 (1956).
14. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948). In this case de-
fendant was held strictly liable for injury caused by the use of hydrocyanic acid
gas for the extermination of pests.
15. Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
In this case the court at least suggested that the maker of herbicide to be sprayed
aerially in dust form might be held strictly liable for harm resulting from its un-
suspected propensity to drift for great distances. See Note, 3 VAND. L. REV. 341
(1950).
16. Professor Seavey has recently proposed strict liability in favor of atomic
radiation victims. See 25 HEIAv. L. RECORD No. 8, p. 1 (Nov. 14, 1957).
17. The Sorenson case was an action by a candidate for public office against
the speaker (a candidate for a different office) and a radio station for libel in the
course of a campaign speech broadcast over the station's facilities. The station
pleaded that it did not know in advance the contents of the speech, that it was
not negligent in preventing its publication, and that it was forbidden by what is
now Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act (37 U.S.C.A. § 315) to censor
political speeches by candidates for public office. The state supreme court held
that (1) liability of a radio station for defamation was strict, even where the
speaker was not the station's employee, and was not based on negligence; and (2)
the prohibition against censorship in the federal statute created no privilege in
the station under the state law of defamation, since it did not forbid deletion of
defamatory statements but "merely prevents the licensee from censoring words as
to their political and partisan trend."
Although the questions raised in Sorenson have not been settled, either by later
Congressional legislation or by a federal Supreme Court decision, later decisions
have made the case very questionable general authority. See, e.g., Felix v. West-
inghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd 186 F.2d 1
(3d Cir. 1950), cert. den., 341 U.S. 909 (1950) ; Dale System v. General Teleradio,
105 F.Supp. 745, 751-2 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Charles'Parker Co. v. Silver City
Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955) ; Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L.
695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948) ; Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc.
787, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 985 (1942) ; Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
For the attitude of the Federal Communications Commission on the scope of
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debate. 18 This, it seems to me, would be too high a price to pay
for the additional protection given to private reputations by
strict liability here. Moreover the injury is of a different type
and one for which money damages are not nearly so appropriate
a remedy.
the prohibition against censorship in political campaign speeches, see Port Huron
Broadcasting Co., 4 Pike & F. Radio Reg. 1 (1948), noted, 58 YALE L.J. 787
(1949) ; W.D.S.U. Broadcasting Corp., 7 Pike & F. Radio Reg. 769 (1951).
Law review comment on the problem has been prolific. Some highlights are
Vold, Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio, 19 MINN. L. REV. 611 (1935)
Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IowA L. REV. 12 (1948);
Leflar, Radio and TV Defamation; ,Fault" or Strict Liability, 15 OHIO ST. L.J.
252 (1954).
18. See Dale System v. General Teleradio, 105 F.Supp. 745, 751-2 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) ; CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 521 (1941) ; materials col-
lected in SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 950-1007 (2d ed.
1952).
